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Abstract
In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case
in whirh private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum
levol of ulilit.y if he cunsnmes no private guods, irrespective of the public goods
consumed. 'í'his note develops the second welfare theorem for economies with
public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also
derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.
1 Introduction
Mas-Colcll (1980) departed from the earlier literature on economies with public goods
in that he considered personalized prices for access to the public good ("valuation
prices") rather than personalized prices for uraits consumed of the public good, as in
the literature on Lindahl equilibriurn. This departure in pricing permitted a reconsid-
eration of how one describes public goods. With Lindahl prices one assumes that the
quantity of each public good is represented by a real number, and the equilibrium es-
tablishes what quantit.y will be supplied. In valuation equilibrium the supplier chooses
from a set of integral public project,s, and there is no need to order projects by mag-
nitucíe or any other criterion. 'I'he valuation pricew faced by a consumer arr different
for different. public projects, and equilibrium has the property that at these prices no
consumer would prefer a different selecl.ion from the set of potential projects t.han 1.hr
one offered. In addition, no other public project would be profitable.
R.ecently, some authors have extended the concept of valuation equilibrium in
various ways. I)iamantaras and Gilkw (1994) extend the welfare theorems for valuation
c~quililtriiini to rnult.iplc~ priva.tc, };uudx, ati wc~ll as c~xtcnding n~sults un Lhr rcl~rtcd nol.ion
of cost-shan~ cquilibrinni. Manning (19!):3) mainl,ains thc hypothcsis of one privatc
good, and shows Lhal. t.he wc~lfam t.hrnrcrns pcrsist cvcn with a fixed numbcr of mriltiplc
liirisdict ionti, whc~n~ :c{;c~nt,~ can nruvc, amung jurisdictions if such a movc would irnprove
ul,ilil.y. Sculchtuc~r and Wuoclc~rs (1!)87) and Scotchmcr (1994) introducc the notion
of competitive eyuilibriurn with "admission prices" in club economies with free entry,
and show eyuivalence to the eyual-treatment core. Admissions prices are like valuation
prices in that they arc pcrsonalized lump sum payments which depend on the public
good. When there are multiple jurisdictions - a fixed number or an endogenous
number - the valuation prices or admission prices must also depend on the coalition.
Wit.h one exception the theorems of these authors, including Mas-Colell, use an"essentiality" assurnption for private goods, which consists at least of the statement
that each age.nt recaivc~s a(ixed rninimum utility if he consumes no private goods, ir-
respective uf the~ puhlic goods. 'I'he essentialit.y condition is strong in tbat iL excludes
the case of transfcrable ut,ility. Ilowever Scutchrner ( 1994) showed for club economies
that the c~s,c~ntialif.y coudil.ion is not. requimd for cquivalence of the equal-treatment
core and competitive equilibrium with admissions prices, and this suggests that the
condition can be avoided more generally. In this paper we combine the ideas in that
proof with the ideas in Diarnantaras and Gilles (1994) their proof of the second welfare
theorem, which used essentiality, to show that essentiality can be avoided, even with
nu,ll.iplc, privatc, fiuodx. Sincc~ c:tisrnl.ialit,y is t.ypica.lly used for t,hc~ scrond wclfarc t.ho-
orcnr but. not for tóc~ lirst unc~, we uuly pnwc~ul. Lhu second welfare, Lhe~crrern. (l~or thc~
first welfare theorem with multiple private goods, see Diamantaras and Gilles (1994).)
The basic idea is as follows. Suppose t,hat it is efficient to produce a public
project ,y. Suppose t.here is anot,her project z thal, an agertt, say a, would prefer to
y even if hr wc,ra given no privatc goods. '1'his would violate essentiality. Since y is
cfficicnl., sunu~ agc~nl.s nrast dislikc, z. 'l'hcir cornpausations for accepl.ing z would havc
to be high enough so that, i( they were comprnsated, covering the cost of z would be
socially infcasiblc. 'I'his implics that Lhe valuation prices that make them indifferent
betwe~en z and y arc relat.ively low. We can find a valuation price for agent a that
exceeds Lhe valuc~ o[ his cudowrucnt, so that hc cannot afford z, but is still low enough
so that z is unprofitable.
2 Definitions and the main result
We study an econorny in which A is a finite set of economic agents, there are Q E IV
private commodities, and the commodity space is represented by W~. We denote by
t.he funcl.ion rn: A-a ~f~ `{0} thc endoTOment of private cornmodit,ies of the agents in
A whcrc- ia :- ~„En vn(~)~~ 0.
'I'hcre is a sef. ,y of puhlíc projects, on which we do not impose any structure.
Each public project has a cost in terms of each private good, and we capture this by
the vector-valucd function c: y-~ 1R~. Of course, one can easily adopt some metric
or 1?ucliclc~a.n structure on thc~ set y, as is customary when one discusses Samuelson
conditions or Lindahl pricing.
l~;ach agent a E ~l has preferences defined on It~ x y, which are represented bya real-valued funcl.ion Uo: N~ x,y --~ Qi. The ut.ility function Ua is strictly monotone
if for all f,g E 1R~ and all y E Y with f~ g, Ua(f,y) ~ Ua(g,y). The utility function
U„ is quasi-concane ii for all z E,i~ and for all u E 1R, the set {g E Rt~U„(g,z) 1 u}
is convc,x. 'I'hc~ utilit.y frnirlion U„ is ronfinuon., if for all z E Y Lhc funct.ion U„(.,z) is
continuous.
An rcononn~ iti a cullc~cl.iou 1: - {A,(U„)„En,w„v,c}. An allocation for an
economy i~; is a pair (j, y) where j: A-i Rt and y E Y. An allocation (j, y) is feasible
ir
~ j(a) f ~(y) - ,- ,,.
aEA
Note that we do not assume free disposal in provision; however, our results hold under
the free disposal assumpt.ion. We denote the set of [easible allocations by ~.
The following definit.ion is standard.
Definition 2.1 A jeasible allocation (f, y) E ~ is Pareto efficient jor the economy
E ij there is rao altocatio~n (g, z) E~ such that
(i) jnr cv~erya in A, f~„(g(a),z) ? Ua(.((a),y)~ and
(ii) therr. exisls an agr.nl 6 E A such lhat Ue(g(b), z) ~ Uy( f( b), y).





The following de(inition is a natural extension of Mas-Colell's definition of valuation
eyuilibricun to the case of multiple private goods. In this definition agents maximize
utility taking into account, price changes in the private sector of the economy resulting
from changing the choice of lhe public project. Thus a complete contingent price
systr~m rat.hr~r I,han a rmictnr~ price vect,or is taken as given by the agents.
Definition 2.2 A jrasiblr allnculion (j, y) E ~ is a valuation equilibrium jor 1~ ij
lhrrr rri.vl re pr~irr .,y.,IrnA p:,y' -~ ,S'~-r anrl a. ~rrtl~artfintt junclion V: A x Y--1 )fi sucít
lha~
(i) llr.crc is Ludgcl nculralily, i.c., ~aEn V( a~ y) - p(y) ' c(y);
(ii) jor every agent a E A, p(y) . j(a) } V( a, y) - p(y) . w(a) and Jor all (g, z) E
4~~ x j~, ij U„(g, z) ~ Ua(j(a), y), then P(z) ' 9 -~ V(a, z) ~ p(z) ' w(a);4
(iii) y rnacimízes lhc surplu.c ~aEn V(a, z) - p(z) . c(z) Jor z E y.
In Diamanlar~~.ti and (~illcs (1994) t.hc additional condition V(a, z) G p(z) . ru(a) for all
~ E,}~ and all n E A is addc~d to (ii). With Lhis condition iL might bc impossible to
support a Na,reto optimcnn ax a.~i rquilibrium if privat.c goods are not essential. This is
because a cousucuer might prefer an allocation (g, z) to the Pareto e(licient allocation
( J, y) even if the allocation (g, z) gives him rero private goods. lf the valuation price
cannot cxc-eed the value of his endowment he can afford such an allocation, and then
condition (ii) of the de(iuitiou of valuation cyuilibrium cannot. bc satisficYi.
This defiuition - along with the one in Diamantaras and Gilles (1994) - has
the unusual characteristic of ernploying a price systern for the private goods. This
mca.ns t.hat to a specific valuation equilibrium (f, y) there corresponds not just one
vcclor of priccs of thc privaLc' goods, buL as rnany as I,lue potcnt,ial public projcct,s. Ouc
can show that full Nareto efíiciency may not be reachable by a definition that would
imose a single price vector per equilibrium, but our use of price systems is motivated
by considerations beyond necessity. In particular, it is akin to the notion of rational
expectations equilibrium, although less strong in its implications. A price system, in
our usage, embodies the predictions of what would happen to the prices of the private
goods if the~ choice of the public project were to be altered. These predictions are
assumed held in unison by all the agents, but they do not have to be "correct" in
any sense. It is the last point that makes our definition conceptually less demanding
than the idca of rational expectat,ions equilibrium. A specific criticism of our price
systems is ihat the agents do not act as price takers because a different choice of a
public project, yields a different price vector. Elowever, a different choice of a public
project can only be made collecaivcly; no individual alone has much influence on it, at
least. in economies with rnore than a few agents. Further, the notion of agents as price
takc~rs in traclitional equilihriun~ cxmcepts, such as Lindahl equilibrium, is strained.
Nc'vert.hclc~sti, we use such c~quilibriucn conc~pt.s witli some confidence because we now
know Lhat. it. is poasible~ Lo i~nplcment. t.heir allocations as eyuilibria of games. A similar
application of irnplementation theory to our frarnework remains to be períormed.
"I'he valuation price V(a,z) can be thought of as an access price for the right
to consume public project z aud private goods at prices p(z). Economies where such
access prices arise naturally are club economies such as those discussed by Scotchmer
(1994). In club economies the access price - or admission price - must depend on
the coalit.ion as well as on the public good since the public goods will be provided ina partition of the population where the elernents of the partition can differ from each
othcr in bot.h public goods and t.he types of inembers. In competitive equilibrium t}te
admisaion prices or valuation prices govern the partition of consumers into jurisdictions.
It is our purpose t.o invest.igate the equivalence of the set of Yareto efficient allocations
and Ihe~ tic~t uf valuat.iun eqiiilihria in an econunry with public projecLs and multiple
public proje,cts. l)ianrantaras and Gilles (1994) show that if agents have monotone
prefereuceti any valuat,ion equilibriurn is Pareto effiicient. For the reverse they, however,
nc~c~d cc,rtain c~ssc,iil.iality cunclitiuns un privatc. "I'hc following thcxrrcin statcs thal.
without essentiality conditions on the private goods any Pareto efficient allocation can
be supported as a valuation equilibrium.
Theorem 2.3 Far every aqent a E A let the utility furzction Ua be continuous, quasi-
concave and strictly monotone. Then every Pareto efj~ icient allocation in F, can 6e
suppnrted a.v a valuation cquilibrium.
PHOOF
Let (f,,y) bc a Pareto efficient allocation in F, and let z E y be arbitrary. We define
A`(z) :- {a E A I Ua(y, z) G Ua(f(a), y) for every g E R~ },
A""(z) :- {a E A~Ua(O,z) ~ Ua(f(a),y)},
F(a,z) :- {9 E Rtt ~(~a(9, ~) ~ ~a(f(a), y) }, a E A~[A~(z) U A~(z)],
F(a,z) -- {9 E 1R~ ~ Ua(9,z) ? Ua(f(a),y)}, a E A`(A'(z) U A"(z)],
F(a,z) .- Á2t}, a E A"'(z),
F(a, z) :- 9~~. a E A""(z).
If we wcre to try to extcnd the definition of F(., z) to a E A'(z), we would have
I"'(u, -) N for a C~ r1`(:). Ity Lhe assnnipt.iuns on I~a, for each a E A~ A'(z), f(a, z)
is nunc~ni~cLy, upc~n, c'uirvc,x. ~in~l hunndc~d Iruin he~uw. Lc~l.
h'(z) :- ~ l"'(a,z) t {c(z) - v~},
aEA`[A"(z)uA"(z)J
H'(z) :- ~ F(a, z) t{c(z) - w}.
nEA`[A'(z)UAt"(z)]
'l'he sct 1"'(z), when non-ernply (i.e., when [A"(z) U A"(z)] ~ A), is open, convex, and
bounded from below. 'I'he set Í"'(z) has the same properties except that it is closed.6
Becausc thc recession cones (Rockafellar (1970), page 61) of the sets F(a,z) are all
contained in R~, Corollary 9.1.1 of Rockafellar (1970, page 74) applies, hence F(z) is
also the closure of h'(z), denoted c1F(z).
We now const.ruct posit.ive prices for private goods, p(z) E intS~-r for all z E,y.
'1'ogether with the valuation prices constructed below, these. will support Ihe allocation
(f,y) as a valuation equilibrium.
Ct,nIM
Suppose that A"(z) -(~ aud A~ A'"(z) ~ ~l. '1'hen Ihere cxist p(z) E intS~-~ aud
vectors x(a, z) E F(a,z), a E A, such that
(r) p(z) - r.(a,z) - inf{p(z) . x ~ x E h'(a,z)} for all a E A,
(~~) ~„EA x(a, z) f c(z) - vu ~(1, and
(rir) r(a, z) - x(a, y) - f(a), for every a E A, if z - y.
PROOF OF CI,AIM
Because (j, y) is efficient, we have 0~ F(z). By the strict monotonicity of pref-
erence~s and A"(z) - ~, t.here exist.s rc(z) E lfit~ such that K(z)e E F(z), where
e:- (1, 1,..., 1) E Rr. Hence there exists a(z) E Rt (possibly 0) such that a(z)e E
cIF'(z) `F(z) - F(z) `F(z).
Now we choose values x(n, z). For z- y let x(a, y) satisfy (iii). We have 0 - a(y)e -
~aEq J(a) } c(z) - w because (f,y) is an efficient allocation. For z ~ y and all
a E A`A"(z) we will choosc x(a,z) E F(a,z) such that
~(z)e - ~ x(a, z) f c(z) - w.
~EA`A"(z)
By definition of a(z)e the vectors x(a, z) cannot be in the interiors of F(a, z). For
a E A"'(z), we set x(a, z) - 0.
Now we show that a supporting hyperplane for F(z) at ~(z)e must have positive
coefí~ icients (prices). For that purpose let p(z) E Rr `{0} be such that p(z) . v,
p(z) - a(z)r for all v E I'(z). 'I'hat wc~ can choose p(z) to satisfy these properties follows
from the standard supporting hyperplane theorem, e.g., Rockafellar ( 1970), Theorem
11.6, page 100, applied to F(z), since a(z)e ~ F(z), F(z) is convex and open, and F(z)
is the interior of F(z).
Next let Ihe vectors ali(a, z), for all a E A ` A~(z), be defined by ~i(a, z) - x(a, z) -}-
(1IIA `A""(z)~)r~, whrre fur any set. .S, ~.5~ drnotes t.he number of elcrnents of .S, and7
where er -(1, 0, ..., 0) E lli~ is the first unit vector of R~. By strict monotonícity,
~i(a,z) E F(a,z) for all a E A`A`"(z), hence
rji(z) :- ~ zli(a, z) f c(z) - w E F(z).
„En`.n-~(:)
~4rc~ Lhc~n havc~ Lhat
P(z) ' rh(z) - P(z) '~Íz)e - Pr(z) 1 0.
Repeating the argurnent for every coordinate p;(z) of p(z) shows that p(z) ~~ 0. We
can now scale the vector p(z) without loss of generality to achieve p(z) E intS~-r.
('ondil.iun (i) huldx fur all z fur whicii A`(z) is c~inpty, including ,y, hr, au.c~ ul.hc~rwinr
p(z) could uot be a supporting hyperplane to h'(z) at a(z)e. Coudition (ii) holds
because ~(z)e J 0. Condition (iii) holds by construction. Thus the Claim is shown.
For z such Lhal. A`(z) ~ Ql or A` A""(z) - 0 wc Ict p(z) E intSt-r, and for all
a E A` A'(z), we choosc x(a, z) such that (i) holds. ( It is obvious that such x(a, z)
exist, following a. similar ar);ument. as useck in t.he proof of the. Clairn.) For a E A'(z)
IeL x(a,:) - 0.
We have t,hus cíefined a fcmction p: y-" intS~-'. We now construct the valuation
function. I~or this construction we will let
P(z)~'~(z) :- P(z) ~~~ x(a, z) i c(z) - wJ .
E~
Define a parameter ó(z) E Rt~ when A~(z) ~ 0 as follows. If p(z)F(z) ~ 0, let
ó(z) ~ 0 bc such that ó(z) ~(~A""(z)~)-'p(z)F(z). If p(z)F(z) C 0, A'(z) ~ 0.
(Otherwise, since A"(z) ~ 0, t.here would be an allocation (g, z) that Pareto dominates
(f, y).) In that case Iet ó(z) G(~A"(z)~)-r ~nEAx(~) p(z) . w(a). The latter bound is
positive because p(z) ~~ 0 and we have assumed that w(a) ~ 0 for all a E A.
hct V(., z) hc, dc,kincd by
p(z) . rn(ce) - p(z)' :c(~,z), if a E A~[A'(z) U A"(z)],
V(a, z) :- p(z) . w(a) - p(z) . x(a, z) ~ b(z), if a E A"'`(z),
min (0, ( ~A'(z)~)-'P(z)F(z)} , if a E A'(z).
We now check the conditions for a valuation eyuilibrium.
CONUITION (1)
By definition, A'(y) - A"(y) - ~, so V(a,y) - p(y) . [w(a) - f(a)]. Hencen
~ V(a, ?I ) - p(?I) ' c(?I ) - P(?f ) ' ~~ w(a) - ~, f(a ) - c(y)~ - fi,
aEA nEA aEA
by the feasibilit.y of the allocation (f,y).
CONDI'I'ION (Itl)
hote t.hal x(a, z) - 0 if a E.1'(~) or a E A"`(z). We have
~ V(a, z) - P(z) ' c(z) -
aEA
p(v) . ~ 7U(a) - p(z) ~~ x(a, z) -I- ~A..(z)~b(z)
aEA`A~(z) nEA
} min {o, p(z)r(z)} - p(z) . c(z)
P(z) ' ~~w(a) - x(a, z)) - P(z) ' ~ w(a) f ~A~(z)~ó(z)
aEA aEA~(z)
f min {0, p(z)F(z)} - p(z) . c(z)
-p(ti)F~(z) - p(~) -~ ,,,(a) -~ ~A`~(z)~s(z) t min {o,n(w)r(z)} ~ o,
aEA`(z)
by the dcfinition oC ó(z).
CONDITION (II)
We have p(z) 1~ 0 by construction. For a E A'(z), there is no (g,z) preferred to
(f(a),,y), so 1.hc condit.ion is sal.is(icd trivially. For n E A"(z), V(a, z) ~ p(z) . w(a) -
p(z).w(a)-p(z).x(a,z). 5upposethereexistsg E R} such that Ua(g,z) ~ Un(f(a),y).
'Phen p(z) -g ~ 0 and so, sincc x(a, z) - 0, P(z) - q f V(a, z) ~ p(z) . x(a, z) -}- V(a, z) 1
p(z) . w(a), which proves that the reyuired condition holds.
For a E A`[A`(z) U A"(z)], suppose that there exists g E R~ such that Ua(g, z) 1
Un( f(a), y). 13y a~ A`"(z), (~n(0, z) C Ua(f(a),y) C Un(g, z), hence g~ 0. Suppose,
without. loss of generality, that gr ~ 0. Let er denote the first unit vector in R~. By
the continuit.y of Un(-, z), therc exists e~ 0 such that Ua(g - eer, z) 7 Un(f( a), y),
implying that p(z).g ~ p(z). (g-ce') ? p(z)-x(a,z), where the first inequality follows
because p(z) 11 0 and the second one by the construction of x(a, z). But then we have
p(z) . q f V(a, z) ~ p(z) ~ x(a, z) ~ V(a, z) - p(z) - w(a), which proves that the required
conditian holds. ~
1'he sec ond welfare theorem [or valuation equilibrium differs from the second welíare
t.he~orem for c urnpc~t.il.ive c~quilibriurn in exchange economies in that we do not need toO
choose diffcrent endowrnents in order to support different Pareto optima as equilibria.
Since the valuation prices can serve the purpose of transfering endowments among
agcnts, thc, sarnc~ c~ndowrnent.s can be uscd Cor differcnt Pareto optima. Thus thcre is
liltle distinct.ion bet.ween proviug the second welfare theorem and proving that such
eyuilibria exist. This is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.9 Corrsirler on rronomy such that jor every agent a E A the utility func-
tion Ua is continuous, quasi-concave and strictly monotone on II}, and w(a) 1 0 for
all a E A. Then fhere exisls a valuation equilibriuna.
PROOF
By thc previous theorem every Pareto efficient allocation can be supported as a val-
uation equilibrirun with cudowments m(a) 1 0 fixed in advance. Thus it suf6ces to
show Lhaf. t.here exists a Parel.o ef6cient allocation. But this follows because utility
functions arc continuous, Lhe aggregate endowment is finite, and the number of agents
anci potential public projects are finite. ~
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